



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Where Is Egypt Going?

by John S. Badeau

CAIRO — Two months have passed since the dramatic *coup d'état* of Major-General Mohammed Naguib sent King Farouk I into exile and established a new regime in Egypt. How does the account now stand? Is this a genuine revolution or simply one of those manœuvres of parties and cliques that have kept Egyptian life in turmoil since World War II?

The general answer must be that this is a real revolution, but a revolution whose strength and endurance await their most severe tests. Certainly the military government is not simply the hand of old parties pulling the strings behind the new façade. At first it was suspected that the Muslim Brotherhood or the Wafd had utilized army dissatisfaction to liquidate the Palace. Now it is plain that a new political force has taken control of Egypt, a force which represents a fresh point of view and a program of drastic change. The "blessed movement" (as the press always calls it) owes nothing to the Wafd; and while some of its members have been attached to the Brotherhood and, like it, are dedicated to a "new regime," there is no evidence that the Brotherhood created or controls it. "Some-

thing new has been added" to the political life in Egypt.

How genuinely new this something is appears in General Naguib's program of deliberate destruction ("housecleaning" is the Arabic word) of the patterns of past political life. The dismissal of the king and his palace cohort; the abolition of titles (and the suggestions of influence that go with them), the forced reorganization of political parties and the wholesale resignation of their past leaders, the new leadership in the Arab League—all these are signs of a determination to break the old, weary round of political frustration and inefficiency.

But the most hopeful sign of the new regime is its shift in emphasis from foreign relations to the urgent need for internal reorganization and social reform. This does not mean that Egypt has abandoned its long struggle for complete and unoccupied independence. That struggle is too deep to be brushed aside permanently. But at last the immediate and pressing claims of social and economic reorganization have been made the center of the government's program. Plans for drastic land redistribution, a determined attack on cor-

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ruption in government, insistence that student and labor disorders shall not imperil social stability, more co-operative legislation for foreign business—these are measures that strike at the root of Egypt's recent instability.

All this has created a new atmosphere of hope in the country. Ever since the war there has been an air of helplessness hanging over the valley of the Nile. The struggle with Britain was bitter but ineffectual; living costs have mounted; corruption has grown—and the parties in power could not or would not do anything about it. Now Egypt, without foreign intervention (which has come so often in the past), has shown promise of setting its own house in order. People really dare to hope that a new day has dawned.

Land Reform

But before Mohammed Naguib's government can fulfill this promise, it must face and solve some basic challenges to its strength. The first is its own lack of political experience and personnel. For many years Egypt's affairs have been in the hands of a tight oligarchy of parties and leaders; there has been remarkably little fresh blood in government for the past 20 years. This oligarchy has now been ousted, leaving a vacuum in top ministerial circles. Do the eager young men who form the base of the new movement have the political experience to fill the gap?

The problem goes even deeper. For the experienced politician knows that compromise and balance are essential for political stability — he

walks warily. But the new army group is impatient with traditional political jockeying; it wants a rapid and thorough cleansing of government and drastic change in social conditions. That is why Aly Maher's resignation as prime minister was inevitable; he was too experienced a politician to move as rapidly as Naguib demanded. Now, Naguib and his junta have assumed the full weight of government — but can they get along without the politicians?

Moreover, the drastic social program by the army group is in itself a source of difficulty. That land redistribution is urgently needed, no one denies. But there are only some 700,000 acres of land to be redistributed and at least 2 million landless peasant families, each of whom expects to get a plot. When performance cannot catch up with promise, will the government be able to maintain stability?

There will also be the inescapable test of strength with opposition factions. While the number of large landowners, dispossessed political leaders and dissatisfied ex-Pashas is not large, each individual has his own coterie of followers that goes right down to the village level. For the moment these groups have been caught off balance; but if they combine and rally, they can create an effective opposition. While the new government has been prompt and firm in necessary suppression, it has not yet been willing to take extreme measures. Perhaps the most serious center of resistance is the Wafd party, which has always claimed the

widest support in the country, particularly among the villages. Nahas, the Wafd leader, is depending on the former popularity of his leadership and party; the government, on its military control and general support for the program of political purification. If Naguib can meet this crisis and bring the Wafd to heel, he will have broken the most serious threat to his regime.

Naguib and Britain

Yet the most crucial test of the new government will come when it must face the deadlock with Britain. If the British will make some concession with which General Naguib can go to the country as proof of success, the opposition will have their most popular and effective argument cut from under them. But if this military government reaches the same impasse as all former cabinets and stands helpless before the unassailable strength of British control over the Suez Canal and the Sudan, it is doubtful that it can maintain itself permanently in office. For the feeling against British occupation is not merely a trick of politicians for confusing popular feeling—it is a genuine national cause. That cause must be advanced if any new regime is to prove permanent. What General Naguib's policy will be toward Britain is not yet clear. The country is willing to wait while the internal confusion is set right, but it will not wait forever.

(Dr. Badeau, president of The American University at Cairo, is at work on a *Headline Series* book on Egypt which will be published in 1953.)

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Americans Search for New Foreign Policy

SEATTLE—A slow-paced tour through the far Middle West and the Northwest leaves the impression that the United States accepts its world-wide responsibilities as a fact of life which is probably here to stay. Conscious isolationism is uncommon. If this country should turn its back on the world, such revulsion is likely to come, not through any direct abandonment of our present role but as a result of local interest, often intense, in higher tariff protection for local products and of dissatisfaction with the high taxes that go with our expensive form of foreign policy. The understandable longing for lower taxes has been circling like a threatening albatross above the administrators of our foreign policy for several years, but hitherto the desire for security has checked it. The Truman Administration has on the whole resisted the demand for protection. The future effect of these indirect influences working for isolationism will depend on the skill of the next President in dealing with Congress.

Criticisms of Korean War

The diminishing authority of obvious isolationism does not mean, however, that the public is thoroughly pleased with the way we play our role abroad. To be sure, the further west one goes, the more the policy in Europe seems to satisfy the many persons whom a lecturer addresses and meets. The Republican method of campaigning did bring to light one point of disagreement with European policy. The Republican stress on the "liberation" of Eastern European nations from Soviet control aroused some Polish-Americans in Wisconsin to demonstrate for Gen-

eral Dwight D. Eisenhower. But the chief source of dissatisfaction is American policy, and especially the execution of the policy, in Asia, and this runs deep. The focus of dissatisfaction is Korea.

Most of the people one talks to understand very well why the war in Korea is being fought. Many who are certain that the war need never have begun had it not been for "blunders" of the Administration before June 1950 nevertheless accept the Administration's point of view that in entering the conflict the United States and the United Nations have saved other parts of the world from aggression. What roils the critics are the length and the inconclusive character of the war. Wherever one travels, the question eagerly asked is, "How would you end the Korean war?" Soldiers who have fought in this conflict often speak bitterly of it. They remember struggles back and forth over the same terrain, now taking, now losing, now taking again the same hill or valley. The strategy of stalemate adopted more than a year ago, as contrasted with General Douglas MacArthur's strategy of striking at China, no longer has wide approval, even though one finds few people who still take General MacArthur himself seriously as a public figure. The favorable response evoked in some quarters by General Eisenhower's proposal that the South Koreans themselves take over the war suggests the depth of the war's unpopularity among Americans. The new Administration will be faced with the problem either of explaining acceptably why it is worthwhile to keep the war in stalemate for an in-

definite period or of evolving a new strategy, military or political, that will raise hopes for the war's end.

Impatience for Leadership

These criticisms of the Korean war disclose a basic discontent with the position of the United States in world affairs which could in time affect our policy in Europe as well as Asia. The main source of the discontent is impatience with the tendency of the United States to follow rather than lead in world affairs. American foreign policy, it is charged, consists of a series of responses to Soviet moves, and West Coast people express keen regret that the United States, or the United States and its allies, do not guide the course of events. Warmongers appear to be as rare as passenger pigeons, but appreciation of the Administration's effort to safeguard Western security and at the same time avoid a general war by remaining on the defense is almost as rare. Public impatience has already driven the United States over a winding trail in foreign relations since World War II. This country enthusiastically welcomed the United Nations and the Marshall plan, and then criticized both when it became obvious neither was a panacea. The American entry into the Korean war, now so freely condemned, was cheered in June 1950. The United States is unlikely to turn back to isolationism, but a trip across the Plains and through the Rockies and along the West Coast makes it clear that a large portion of the United States is still groping for the kind of foreign policy that will satisfactorily replace isolationism.

BLAIR BOLLES



FPA Members Answer Senators

by Hubert W. Kregeloh

Mr. Kregeloh, chairman of the Connecticut Valley Branch of the Foreign Policy Association since 1949, analyzes international and national affairs over Radio Station WSPR and WSPR-FM, Springfield, Massachusetts, five nights a week. In 1952 he was one of eight broadcasters and journalists who won the "1951 Better Understanding Award" presented annually by the English-Speaking Union of the United States.

IN "Party Quiz on Foreign Policy," published in the BULLETIN of October 15, Senator William Benton, Democrat from Connecticut, asked Republicans four pointed questions which are somewhat of the "have-you-stopped-beating-your-wife" variety. However, I shall attempt to answer them.

The four questions, condensed, read as follows:

1. How Republicans can justify their voting record and reconcile it with the opinions of General Dwight D. Eisenhower;

2. Whether, in the event of a Republican victory, the Taft wing or the "far less influential group" agreeing with General Eisenhower would make foreign policy;

3. What alternative proposals to Administration foreign policy in the Far East the Republicans offered during the period preceding the collapse of the Nationalist government of China;

4. What evidence exists that Republicans resisted our rapid demobilization after World War II.

Senator Benton chooses to ignore the fundamental fact that primary responsibility for the formulation of United States foreign policy in the past two decades, including the post-World War II years, has rested with a Democrat in the White House and with the Democratic Administration.

In many gravely important cases, such as, for instance, the war in Korea, both these formulators of foreign policy confronted the nation and Congress with a *fait accompli* which the Republicans in Congress could not invalidate, had they had

the power to do so, without the most detrimental consequences to American prestige throughout the world.

Senator Benton asks how Republicans in Congress can justify their vote against Point Four and their attempts to "meat-axe" appropriations for ECA, military assistance, the Voice of America and "other positive programs designed to strengthen the free world against communism."

Constructive Republicans

In their campaign pronouncements Senator Benton and all other Democratic politicians sought to create the impression that a solid Republican vote against Administration proposals has existed in Congress. Actually the vote on all measures mentioned by Senator Benton was split in the ranks of both parties, and all foreign policy proposals of the Administration were supported by many Republicans as well as rejected by many Democrats. Moreover, among the Republicans who opposed Administration policies cited by Senator Benton there were many who did not quarrel about the potential usefulness of the measures as such, but questioned the methods by which the Administration carried them out, or the qualifications of the personnel entrusted with their execution, or the need for as much money as was requested.

Many prominent Republicans challenged the wisdom of the tempo of our military demobilization after World War II, but these Cassandras were impotent against the general mood prevailing in those days. That mood, incidentally, was created by

the members of the Administration who insisted—angrily where opposition was evident—that the intentions of the Soviet Union were peaceful and cooperative, that this country had to demonstrate its "good will" in such matters to the Russians and the rest of the world, and that the newly created United Nations would resolve any possible future international complications. The Administration alone had all the means to put into effect the precipitate demobilization after the war, and Republicans, at best, had only the ability to complain after the greatest military apparatus ever assembled on earth had already been dismantled.

Our tragic China policy was consistently challenged by alert Republicans in Congress, led by such men as Walter H. Judd of Minnesota in the House of Representatives and William F. Knowland of California in the Senate. These Republicans were sharply critical of the Owen Lattimore school of thought on Far Eastern affairs, of attempts to present Mao Tse-tung and his followers as "agrarian reformers," and of General George C. Marshall's mediation tactics in the civil war. They warned that Chiang Kai-shek, whatever his shortcomings might be, at least was a friend of the United States in a world in which we surely did not have an abundance of friends, while the Communists were bound to be our enemies. The Administration ignored and ridiculed these Republicans.

In both cases—demobilization and China policy—the State Department

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by Sherman S. Hayden

Dr. Hayden, chairman of the Foreign Policy Association of Worcester, Massachusetts, is associate professor of international relations at Clark University. He was assistant to General Frank R. McCoy, then president of the FPA, from 1942 to 1944, when he left to serve in the Navy for two years.

HERE are my answers to the questions asked by Senator H. Alexander Smith in "Party Quiz on Foreign Policy" published in the BULLETIN of October 15.

1. It is incorrect to contrast containment with liberation. Everyone looks forward to universal liberation as an ideal. A policy of containment is by nature an interim one, and the ultimate choice for the United States must turn on whether the hope of negotiation with Russia is finally rejected or not. Since the Administration has not yet abandoned this hope, although finding no opportunity for its present fulfillment, there appears to be no alternative to maintaining the 1947 policy which attempts to set such bounds as are practicable to the further extension of communism.

To substitute an active policy of liberation means, if anything, to set in motion a systematic program of undermining the "peoples' democracies" of Eastern Europe by any available means. If such a program is to be effective and not merely raise hopes that are doomed to disappointment, it must be pursued with vigor. If it actually makes headway, it will be resisted, and if we persist, hostilities become probable. That is why talk of liberation, as an immediate program and policy, carries a threat of war. Is either party really ready to accept this logical conclusion? And if so, what effect can this conclusion have on our European allies who want above all things to avert war? The so-called containment policy is not the policy of this country alone, and some recent campaign utterances seemed calculated, if only inadvert-

ently, to arouse concern among those nations who fear both war and American domination.

2. The question as to what basis there is for charging that a Republican Administration would be "isolationist" in view of "Republican initiative in the UN, ECA and NATO," is easily answered. No Administration is going to be isolationist, because this country is already committed to an active policy in Europe beyond the possibility of withdrawal. It is true also that participation in the United Nations, ECA and NATO rests on a bipartisan basis, although some comment might be made on the degree of Republican initiative therein, considering that a Democratic Administration was in power throughout the period. The real question is whether a party containing strong elements who are cool toward Europe, who resisted the cooperative policy when it was still an issue, who say we have done enough for the world, or who want to build a Gibraltar in the Western Hemisphere, is best qualified to pursue and administer a course of action opposed to all these points of view, yet irretrievably in effect. There is a great difference between acceptance of a policy in which one genuinely believes and of a policy one pursues only because one must. Who will argue that the Republican party is really devoted to the cooperative policy? Who in Republican ranks has replaced Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg?

3. The policy of "letting the dust settle" followed the loss of China. It did not, as suggested by Senator

Smith, precede or precipitate it. On the contrary, earnest and costly efforts were made to save China, although not necessarily the wisest possible efforts. Our only choices were to embrace the Communists, to seek compromise, as was done, or to stamp the Communists out. How could we have done this last except by force? Is it conceivable that the American people would have assumed this painful task which the Nationalist government had shown itself manifestly incapable of performing?

Once the disaster had occurred, it is hard to see what choice we had but watchful waiting. It can indeed be argued that the situation was allowed to drift too long without any effort to retrieve the initiative and that our whole attitude toward Asia has been too stiff and cautious. Quite possibly a high United States official ought to have visited the Orient sooner, although this is really a problem of public relations which could hardly have much direct effect on the course of events. But the fundamental fact still remains: communism in China cannot now be put down except by force—our force. It is incredible that the Formosan remnant, however well-reconstructed, can do it alone. Again it could be consistently argued that force is the only and therefore the right solution, but the Republican leaders have not seemed to say this, and just what they would do, other than what is being done already, remains obscure.

4. It is undeniable that we gave ground for the suspicion that American power would not be used to defend Korea. It is going too far to say that we publicly abandoned that country. Secretary of State Dean Acheson actually said that defense was not essential under all circumstances. The difficult decision to deny

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Kregeloh

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was supposed to be properly informed and to serve the interests of the American people efficiently regardless of the party which controlled the Administration. It was not the fault of the Republicans that the State Department was poorly informed and included personnel sympathetic to communism.

Finally, it is facetious to inquire whether, in the event of a Republican victory, the Taft supporters or the "far less influential group" agreeing with Eisenhower would formulate United States foreign policy. In the worst case, Democrats would still be in Congress to team up with the actually very powerful wing of

the Republicans which is internationally minded. Besides, Harry S. Truman and especially, before him, Franklin D. Roosevelt, demonstrated that in this day and age an American President wields enormous power to make foreign policy of his personal choice. In this connection it is comforting to note that Senator Benton apparently is not worried about General Eisenhower's own views on foreign policy.

Hayden

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heavy equipment to South Korea was not made arbitrarily or contemptuously but in the light of the notoriously aggressive tendencies shown by certain South Koreans

themselves: Possibly we acted unwisely, but even so, it remains to be proved that our want of decision brought on the war. It seems evident that plans for the attack were laid well before January 1950, and the original date for crossing the 38th Parallel appears if anything to have been postponed, not accelerated, thereafter.

Did the Republican party warn the country of the Korean danger? On the contrary, such aid to Korea as the Administration proposed was turned down in January 1950 by a Republican-Dixiecrat coalition, to the State Department's "concern and dismay." If an error in policy was made, it was not solely that of the Administration:

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



A New Phase in the 'Cold' War

The 19th congress of the All-Union Communist party held in Moscow during the second week of October—the first such congress since the outbreak of World War II—heard a number of statements by Russia's Communist party leaders on the economic, administrative and party problems of the U.S.S.R. These statements will be analyzed in *Foreign Policy Reports* to be published in the BULLETIN in the near future.

To the outside world, however, the most significant feature of the Moscow congress was the analysis of the international situation presented by Premier Joseph Stalin on the eve of the congress in the magazine *Bolshevik*, followed by an extensive address on the same subject on October 6 by Georgi M. Malenkov, Stalin's right-hand man, who is more and more frequently mentioned as successor to the Soviet dictator.

Foreign observers were particularly struck by what appeared at first sight a discrepancy between the Stalin and Malenkov statements. While Stalin discounted the "inevitability" of war between the U.S.S.R. and the United States and, on the contrary, predicted conflict between the "capitalist" countries, Malenkov reaffirmed the view expounded in the current "hate" campaign against the United States, asserting that this country has assumed Hitler's mantle, has launched a drive for world domination, plans to achieve this end by means of a third world war, and has chosen the U.S.S.R. as its chief target because it is the principal nation defending "peace."

Since official Soviet statements are never issued off the cuff, it must be assumed that this seeming divergence has been carefully calculated for a double-barreled effect on public opinion

at home and abroad. Presumably the Kremlin hopes, at one and the same time, to reassure all countries, as well as the Russian people, that large-scale war is not on the agenda, at least for the immediate future. At the same time, by representing the United States as the principal source of warlike intentions and the U.S.S.R. as the citadel of peace, the Soviet leaders apparently hope to detach wavering non-Communist nations fearful of war from Washington, and to drive an ever deeper wedge between the United States and other members of the anti-Russian coalition already taking shape in Europe and gradually emerging in Asia. The assumption that there is no basic divergence between the Stalin and Malenkov statements was confirmed by Stalin's closing address to the Congress on October 15, when he pledged the Soviet party's

support to foreign Communist and "liberation" movements.

The most prevalent impression created by Stalin's interpretation of current world developments is that Moscow counts on what a Marxist would call "internal contradictions" within the coalition led by the United States, not on open warfare, to bring about the collapse of the West. This is the reverse side of the view held by leading Western advocates of "containment" that internal tensions in the U.S.S.R. will bring about the collapse, or at least a mellowing, of the Soviet system. Assuming that war does not come, these two sets of expectations would presage an all-out effort by both sides to see which can first bring about the internal collapse or disintegration of the other.

Is Stalin Right or Wrong?

No sooner had Stalin issued his diagnosis of the international situation than the Western statesmen began to scan the daily budget of news for signs that the Soviet leader's prediction might be fulfilled. French opposition to ratification of the European Defense Community treaty, bickering between the United States and France over "offshore" purchases and the problems of Tunisia and Morocco, racial strife in South Africa and Kenya, not to mention other recent developments, have already been interpreted as evidence corroborating Stalin's dictum.

The West stands to gain by constantly being on the alert to the possibility of fissions in its ranks and by checking imminent disagreements before they have become irremediable. At the same time the West needs to bear in mind that Stalin welcomes the opportunity to encourage unease in European and American minds, and be constantly on watch against yielding to unjustified

pessimism about the "inevitability" of conflicts among non-Communist nations. There are many causes for dissension between the North Atlantic partners, as well as between them and the peoples of the Middle East, Asia and Africa. But to assume that such dissensions must "inevitably" bring about conflict would be to succumb to political determinism. No matter how much other non-Communist nations may differ with the United States on specific policies, there is certainly no prospect of "war" between the members of the North Atlantic coalition.

Meanwhile, it cannot be assumed that the absence of large-scale open war will preclude military activities in strategic areas actively contested by the Communist and non-Communist sectors. There is no lull in the Korean war, and the Viet Minh forces in Indo-China have stepped up their attacks on the French. Else-

where, the Kremlin has indicated that it will encourage a new movement for the creation of "popular fronts" and will give aid to local Communist groups in their struggle for "liberation." The principal line of Moscow's policy, however, as announced at the Communist party congress, will be to emphasize and benefit by any controversies that may develop in the non-Communist segment of the world.

This new phase of the cold war opens up for the United States a prospect far more difficult and baffling than that of military combat. The new Administration will be called on to display the highest qualities of understanding, patience and practical cooperation with our friends throughout the world in a long-term effort to disprove Stalin's prognostications of doom.

VERA MICHELES DEAN



FPA Bookshelf

International Organization, by Norman Hill. New York, Harper, 1952. \$5.

A comprehensive text on the organization and procedures used for the conduct of international relations with emphasis on the actual functioning of international agencies. Historical background of the League of Nations and the United Nations and the diplomatic aspect of international administration are covered. Organization charts and a list of international organizations in which the United States participated under the League and the UN is appended.

Communism in Western Europe, by Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach and Aldo Garosci. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1951. \$3.

A thoughtful and illuminating study of Western European communism, with special emphasis on developments in France and Italy, organized by Professor Einaudi of Cornell, son of Italy's President. The three contributors give a realistic appraisal of the causes and consequences of communism, and offer no easy panaceas, pointing out that the fundamental economic and social problems of contemporary Europe must be

solved if the influence of Communist ideology is to be effectively diminished.

Documents and Readings in the History of Europe Since 1918, edited by Walter C. Langsam, assisted by James M. Egan. Revised and enlarged. Philadelphia, Lipincott, 1951. \$6.

First published in 1939, this useful collection has been brought up to date, providing the basic sources "essential to an accurate understanding of the recent background of current happenings." The arrangement of material is topical and chronological.

The Truth About Yugoslavia, by P. D. Ostovic, with an introduction by the Yugoslav sculptor Ivan Mestrovic. New York, Roy, 1952. \$3.50.

Writing with a warm appreciation of the qualities of the various peoples who make up Yugoslavia, the author, while opposing Communist dictatorship, believes that there is no alternative at present to the Tito regime and that as long as Yugoslavia defends its independence it ought to be helped by the West.

As Others See Us

Stalin's prediction that conflicts among the Western Allies, not war between the U.S.S.R. and the West, are in prospect, has aroused vigorous discussion in the European press.

The Italian historian Luigi Salvatorelli, writing in the independent progressive *La Stampa* of Turin of October 15, says that armed conflict between the Atlantic Allies is out of question but that the possibility remains that internal difficulties will weaken this alliance. Consequently, he declares in an article entitled "Mutual Respect," the most urgent need now is not rearmament, "highly important though this be," but "a fundamental revision of the relations between the United States on the one hand and its European allies on the other."

André Siegfried of the French Academy, in an editorial in the independent, moderate conservative *Le Figaro* of Paris on October 14, writes: "The European new poor cannot get used to the innocent superiority of the rich American; it is a mistake to suppose that the spectacle of other people's virtue or wealth is pleasant. Here, possibly, is the source of feelings which are regrettable but which have no real

importance when it comes to determining the basic line for the country to follow." The trouble in relations between the United States and the Western European countries, according to Siegfried, is that America tends to behave like a judge rather than an ally, judging Britain as regards Egypt and Iran and judging France as regards North Africa.

In Italy the governmental *Il Messaggero* of Rome of October 11, discussing the best reply to Stalin's prediction of quarrels between the countries of the West, declares that it is certainly not the "hare-brained appeals for a new crusade" to liberate oppressed territories. The only effective answer, it maintains, is the radical elimination of those "partitions," as it were, which still weaken the alliance. "It is impossible to speak of a community between those who are not equal, between depressed areas and areas of overabundance, between weak peoples and strong, between countries which shut their door in each other's face."

Discussing the military balance of power in Europe, Adelbert Weinstein, noted contributor of articles on military questions in the conservative German newspaper, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, contended on September 29 that, contrary to many pessimistic prognostications, Europe can probably be defended.

After pointing out that "there is really nothing to show that the United States does not intend to join in the defense of Europe's soil," he wrote: "The West, which is fond of figures, is hypnotized by the 502 divisions which the Soviets can raise and the 175 which they have ready for action. As a matter of fact, however, this numerical superiority of the Reds does not stand even superficial analysis. The only forces which one must really reckon with at present are the divisions stationed in the Soviet zone of Germany." Under the circumstances, he declared, "Atlantic Headquarters can say already now that unless the Kremlin mobilizes, the whole of rump Europe can probably be held with the forces at present available. With German divisions this probability could even become a certainty."

France's resentment over the attitude taken by the United States on Tunisia and Morocco was vigorously expressed by Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin, commander-in-chief of the NATO land forces in Central Europe, in the October issue of *Hommes et Mondes*. "This is a serious matter," he wrote; "it wounds our feelings and runs counter to the view of international solidarity which we had held until now and for the sake of which we had already made so many sacrifices."

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